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1 In  the  decade  following  the  passage  of  the  North  American Free  Trade  Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1994 and the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995,
Canadians confronted a new layer of complexity and uncertainty affecting health care
policy  and health  care  reform.  At  the  same time that  federal  transfers  were  being
limited  to  balance  the  federal  budget  and  reduce  the  national  public  debt,  several
government bodies were considering the growing fiscal, demographic, technological,
and other challenges to health care policy. In 2002, several key reports on the future of
health care were released, each of which outlined visions for reforming the Canadian
health care system: those of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada or
Romanow  Report;  the  Standing  Senate  Committee  on  the  State  of  the  Health  Care
System or Kirby Report; and the Government of Alberta Premier's Advisory Council on
Health or Mazankowski Report.  Although the Romanow Report emphasized steps to
improve the sustainability of the existing system, the Kirby Committee drew attention
to the possible benefits of  more competitive health care delivery models,  while the
Mazankowski  Report  and  the  Alberta  government  even  signaled  a  willingness to
consider diverse private funding and payment models, making frequent reference to
the  need  for  greater  competition  and  consumer  choice.  Notwithstanding  concerns
about health care costs growing approximately twice as fast as the economy, lack of
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coverage for drugs and home care for an aging population, and lengthening wait lists
for surgery, federal Liberal governments during this period stressed the protection of
universal single-payer health care for essential health services, even announcing (once
the federal budget had been balanced) a huge increase in health transfers in 2004 when
prime minister Paul Martin brought in what he called a "fix for a generation" with his
10-year,  $41-billion  Health  Accord.  Yet  at  the  same  time,  successive  federal
governments  of  both  Liberal  and  Conservative  stripes  were  also  working  to  better
institutionalize  economic  neoliberalism  and  limit  the  policy  autonomy  of  states
through international economic agreements.
2 Many  commentators  observed  an  incompatibility  in  the  respective  logics  of  our
purportedly steadfast health care policies and the newly accepted principles of trade
liberalization that prevailed after the Free Trade election of 1988. Canada, inspired by
the  example  of  Saskatchewan  and  encouraged  by  the  federal  government's  1957
Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act (that reimbursed one-half of provincial and
territorial costs for hospital and diagnostic services administered under provincial and
territorial health insurance programs) and the 1966 Medical Care Act (which expanded
the  HIDS  Act  expense-sharing,  allowing  each  province  and  territory  to  initiate  a
universal  public  health  care  plan),  established  a  public  sector  health  insurance
monopoly  for  “medically  essential  services”  provided  by  (largely  private,  fee-for-
service)  physicians  and (largely  not-for-profit,  globally  funded)  hospitals.  Since  the
1984  Canada  Health  Act (CHA)  regulates  who  can  provide  healthcare  by  prohibiting
commercial insurance coverage of hospital and physician services covered by medicare,
and discouraging extra-billing and user fees, it cuts against the grain of "free trade,"
which  aims  to  optimize  competitive  market  conditions  by  opening  markets  to  all
investors and providers of  goods and services.  The former restricts the commercial
opportunities available to private investors and services providers; the latter enables
and promotes them by limiting at least certain forms of (trade-restrictive) government
regulation.
3 The  Canadian  Liberal  governments  between  1993  and  2006,  which  oversaw  the
implementation in Canada of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS),
as well as participating in the stalled negotiations of both the Doha Development Round
at  the  WTO and the  Free  Trade Agreement  of  the  Americas  (FTAA),  had two main
strategies  for  achieving  and  communicating  about  the  balance  between  trade
agreements and health. First, it emphasized the basic principles of non-discrimination
in trade, i.e. Most-Favoured Nation (MFN), by which all members are granted the same
market access as the most favored member; and National Treatment (NT), which treats
all exporting firms the same as firms in the importing country, challenging trade critics
and skeptics to show how following these basic principles could harmfully constrain
existing healthcare policies and priorities. Second, successive governments emphasized
additional legal safeguards designed to shield the health sector from trade rules, such
as reservations placed in Canada's schedules of commitments, and exclusion clauses (or
"carve-outs") designed to explicitly exempt health-related policies and activities from
coverage in trade agreements. Examples of the former include standard exclusions of
health  and  public  education  services  from negotiated  services  agreements,  such  as
GATS.  Examples  of  the  latter  include  the  GATS  Article  1:3  exception  of  services
“supplied  in  the  exercise  of  governmental  authority”,  and  the  Social  Service
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Reservation contained in Annex II of the NAFTA. A consistent message of the Canadian
government during both the NAFTA and WTO/GATS negotiations was that healthcare
was “off the table” (DFAIT 2000).
4 Each of these strategies however had distinct limitations. First, the evolution of the
international trade agenda beyond the earlier GATT’s focus on conventional tariffs and
non-tariff  barriers on goods has raised doubts about the effectiveness of traditional
protections: in particular, the negotiation of services trade liberalization, government
procurement,  domestic  regulations,  and  especially  the  negotiation  of  trade-related
intellectual  property  and  investment  protection  (TRIPs  and  TRIMs).  Secondly,  the
effectiveness of legal safeguards in exempting or carving out areas of health policy has
been dependent upon the nature of healthcare policies themselves, since the protection
afforded by exemption clauses and careful scheduling of commitments shrinks with the
expansion  of  market  elements  in  health  care.  Hence  the  need  to  assess  the  trade
agreement-related  risks  associated  with  health  policy  change  has  grown
commensurately with market-based health care reforms. 
5 Canada’s willingness to experiment with market-based health care reform has been
greatly constrained by the general popularity of medicare’s principles as enshrined in
the CHA, coupled with intensive lobbying and publicity on the part of health advocates,
including  medical,  economic,  and  policy  experts  who  point  out  the  high  cost  and
tendency to market failure in private health insurance and for-profit health care in the
United States. Nevertheless, growing dissatisfaction with the performance of certain
aspects of the Canadian system, particularly concerning surgery and diagnostic wait
times, have not often prompted governments to provide better access to health care for
all  Canadians,  either.  Several  provincial  governments,  whether  for  reasons  of
ideological preference or fiscal strain, have shown a growing willingness to allow the
spread of private clinics and the contracting out or reduction of several diagnostic and
treatment services. Moreover, the Conservative federal government from 2006 to 2015,
in keeping with both its spirit of ‘Open Federalism’ and its pro-market ideology, was
not particularly zealous or threatening in its  enforcement of  the Canada Health  Act.
Besides, there has been growing recourse to the courts: in particular, constitutional
challenges to overturn present legal restrictions on privately financed care.1 Chaoulli v.
Quebec2,  as  the  first  successful  challenge  to  the  ban on private  health  insurance  of
medically necessary care to be decided in the Supreme Court of Canada, opened the
door to privately financed essential medical services in cases where reasonable wait
times were not being achieved. This has also spawned a further case, Cambie Surgeries v.
British Columbia3, which challenged the ban on doctors practicing in both public and
private systems and the ban on extra-billing (the key enforcement provision of the
Canada Health Act). Although this attempt to extend the scope of the Chaoulli ruling was
unsuccessful in the B.C. Supreme Court in 2020, it is expected to be appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
 
02. From Broad to Narrow Exemptions
6 Besides these modest movements toward privatization at the domestic legal and policy
level, there were more dramatic developments on the international trade front. The
Harper government built its foreign policy around economic diplomacy and signing a
large  number  of  bilateral  and  plurilateral  trade  and  investment  agreements.  The
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Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), largely negotiated under the
Conservatives but concluded under the Liberals, is illustrative. It contains in Section 28
a list of “Exceptions” that includes the following statement: “The Parties understand
that the measures referred to in Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994 include environmental
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”. This standard
clause (which both Canada and the EU had already adopted by being signatories to the
GATT 1994) helps to preserve a basic minimum of policy autonomy to regulate food
safety and maintain public health but does not afford any added protection. 
7 CETA does not contain an exact equivalent to either the GATS Article I:3 "Governmental
Authority"  Exemption  (excluding  from  the  most  basic  MFN  and  transparency
obligations for services "supplied in the exercise of governmental authority"), or the
NAFTA Annex II Social Service Reservation. Instead, it contains a "Joint Interpretive
Instrument", section 2 of which affirms both Canada's and the EU's right to regulate:
"CETA reserves the ability of the European Union and its Member States and Canada to
adopt and apply their laws and regulations that regulate economic activity in the public
interest,  to  achieve  legitimate  public  policy  objectives  such  as  the protection  and
promotion  of  public  health,  social  services,  public  education,  safety."  This  shelters
government policy capacity from the other provisions of the agreement, but does not
guarantee that any such policy space can be reclaimed once it  has been opened to
commercial activity. Similarly, Section 4 of CETA “does not prevent governments from
defining and regulating the provision of these services in the public interest. CETA will
not  require  governments  to  privatize  any  service  nor  prevent  governments  from
expanding the range of services they supply to the public.” But left unstated are the
likely  obligations  that  would  be  incurred if  such expansion interfered with private
market activity. Furthermore, Article 9.2(a) of the Chapter on Cross-Border Services
echoes the language of the GATS Article 1:3 in stating that “[t]his chapter does not
apply  to  a  measure  affecting…  services  supplied  in  the  exercise  of  governmental
authority"; like the GATS Article 1:3, this is likely to be interpreted to not cover public
services delivered competitively or commercially. While health and medical services
are not explicitly mentioned in the list of professions contained in Annex 19-5 list of
services open to government procurement,  neither is  there any attempt to exclude
cleaning, human resources, or management services related to health; nor is there any
health  exception  contained  in  any  of  the  (admittedly  non-binding)  guidelines  for
Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  (MRAs)  of  professional  credentials.  Indeed,  it  is
unsurprising that  Canada did not  seek to strengthen or broaden its  public  services
exemptions as compared to NAFTA or GATS, given the Harper government’s status as a
demandeur in the negotiations, and an ideologically conservative one at that.
8 These sections and those on Labour and Environmental protection in Chapters 23 and
24 (which do not set specific minimal standards that must be met, but merely affirm
the governments’ right to make policy in these areas) must be balanced with CETA’s
much stronger commitment to institutionalizing Investment Protection and Patents:
Chapter 20 explicitly “complements the rights and obligations between parties under
the TRIPS Agreement” (which already requires signatories to implement 20 years of
patent protection enforced by criminal sanctions), and sets out an additional period of
protection for eligible pharmaceutical products (Article 20.27 sets out the sui generis
protection for  “basic”  pharmaceutical  patents--  a  maximum period of  two years  in
Canada’s case); an agreement “to ensure that all litigants are afforded equivalent and
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effective rights of appeal under patent linkage regimes”; and an agreement to ensure
eight years of protection for data filed with regulators as part of a regulatory approval
process. 
9 Likewise, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP)  contains  the  standard  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  (SPS)  clause  which
maintains  “the  rights  of  parties  to  take  measures  necessary  for  the  protection  of
human,  animal  or  plant  life  or  health,  provided  that  such  measures  are  based  on
scientific principles,” but the scope of the clause is carefully circumscribed. Although
the CPTPP’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement provisions are not as extensive as they
were under the original Trans-Pacific Partnership that included the United States, the
CPTPP SPS chapter 7.2 (d) is intended to "help ensure that CPTPP market access gains
for  Canadian  agricultural  and  agri-food,  fish,  seafood  and  forestry  exports  are  not
undermined by unnecessary or unjustified SPS-related trade restrictions." This chapter
is noteworthy for the way it singles out (the normally uncontroversial) sanitary and
phytosanitary  measures  as  requiring  special  disciplines  to  not  "create  unjustified
obstacles to trade." The CPTPP fails to explicitly recognize either the need to address
climate change (which may necessitate major new policies with health implications) in
the environment chapter, or the need for new public health measures, such as those
that subsequently arose related to COVID-19 and other possible pandemics. 
10 Instead of broad exemptions for a public authority in the CPTPP, we find affirmations
of each party's "sovereign right to identify its regulatory priorities", coupled with an
injunction  towards  "Regulatory  Coherence",  which  is  defined  as  "  the  use  of  good
regulatory practices in the process of planning, designing, issuing, implementing and
reviewing regulatory measures to facilitate achievement of domestic policy objectives,
and in efforts across governments to enhance regulatory cooperation to further those
objectives  and  promote  international  trade  and  investment,  economic  growth  and
employment"(Article 25.2). Whether Regulatory Coherence is a flexible enough concept
to help rather than hinder governmental responses to climate change, pandemics, and
other  public  health-related  exigencies  of  the  twenty-first  century  is  an  important
question. There are reasons, however, to be skeptical, since the regulatory cooperation
commitment  refers  to  a  common  process  whereby  each  country's  policies  will  be
constrained by what is negotiated under the terms of what are essentially commercial
(trade and investment) agreements with the other parties.
11 Table  1  lists  the  trade  treaty  provisions  most  relevant  to  shielding  health  care
jurisdiction from the regulation of international trade in Canada in the 11 trade treaties
signed during the Harper Conservative and Trudeau Liberal governments between 2006
and 2019. All these Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Foreign Investment Promotion
and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) begin with GATT preambles in which, for example,
parties commit to "preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare" and affirm
"the  rights  to  use,  to  the  full,  the  flexibilities  established  in  the  TRIPS  Agreement
including those to protect public health and, in particular, those to promote access to
medicines for all". However, while these general statements are a guide to interpreting
the Agreement, they are also set alongside and must be balanced with, many other
statements  that  commit  the  parties  to  "reduce  distortions  of  trade",  "enhance
competitiveness", "promote economic integration", and so on. 
12 Under the original General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), there were several
provisions obligating Members not to engage in discriminatory trade practices that
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serve to block imports, such as Article I (Most-Favoured Nation or MFN); Article III (4)
(National Treatment); and Article VI (Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties). Article
XX, which listed ten general exceptions that governments could use to justify import
restrictions, has acted as a 'safety valve' which allows the Member States to balance
their policy goals with free trade. For example, in the 1990 Thai Cigarettes case, the
government of Thailand was afforded a “margin of appreciation” under Article XX to
ban imports of cigarettes, even though less trade-restrictive measures were available,
but in the Brazil Tyres case (2007), Brazil's ban of retreaded tires from Europe (in favor
of retreaded tires from Brazil that had the same effect of serving as breeding grounds
for mosquitoes)  was not upheld (Trebilcock 2015,  150-155).  Of  course,  this  case law
merely  dealt  with a  limited number of  general  exceptions  to  import  bans;  the  SPS
Agreement covered a broader range of potential measures applied to protect animal or
plant life or health within the territory of a member based on scientifically-evaluated
risks (Epps 2008). 
13 Nevertheless, while the adoption of both Article XX and SPS is a standard feature of all
of Canada's trade and investment agreements, they hardly touch the main features of
domestic health policy frameworks: social insurance; payment and delivery systems;
institutional and human resource roles; and breadth of coverage. Yet the agenda of
international economic agreements have increasingly impacted each of these areas at
precisely the time when new general carve-outs such as the NAFTA Reservation and
Article 1:3 are being used less often. Table 1 shows a greater enthusiasm for specific
Non-Derogation clauses  (i.e.  treaty  provisions  that  explicitly  guarantee  that  certain
laws and regulations will  not  be waived or otherwise derogated from to encourage
trade or investment) during the Harper minority years, for example, Article 11 of the
Canada-Peru FIPA of 2008 and the Canada-Jordan FIPA of 2009. In these mini-carve-
outs,  “the  Parties  recognize  that it  is  inappropriate  to  encourage  investment  by
relaxing  domestic  health,  safety  or  environmental  measures.”  They  represent  an
exception to the trend towards legal limitations that must be balanced or harmonized
with market imperatives, as opposed to being simply reserved to the public sphere.
Their  disappearance  from  the  later  FIPAs  with  Panama  (2010)  and  Ukraine  (2015)
reflects  a  deeper  commitment  to  strengthening  investment  guarantees  in  bilateral
FTAs and BITs than has been achievable in multilateral contexts, such as the stalled
Doha Round of  the  WTO (2001-2006)  or  the  proposed Trade in  Services  Agreement
(2014-present).  The  Government  of  Canada  also  touts  “[t]he  development  and
implementation of  trade-related Labour Cooperation Agreements (LCAs) and Labour
Chapters of Free Trade Agreements (LCFTAs)”,4 which affects work-related health and
safety, but these provisions typically only commit each party to not "waive or derogate
from" its own labour laws in a manner "that weakens or reduces adherence to the
internationally recognized labor principles and rights" and mandates consultations and
a Review Panel in the event of a complaint.
14 One  can  find  fairly  broad  NAFTA-like  social  service  reservations  within  particular
sectors,  such as government procurement.  The Annex 5 Reservation in the Canada-
Panama FIPA,  for  example,  excludes  “all  classes”  of  health  and social  service  from
national treatment in tendering of procurement for government purposes; the Canada-
Korea FTA contains an even broader reservation for all  types of future measures in
Social Services. In the Annex II Schedule of the Canada-Peru FTA, for example, Canada
does state, concerning Cross-Border Trade in Services And Investment, that it "reserves
the right to adopt or maintain any measure for the provision of public law enforcement
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and correctional services, and the following services to the extent that they are social
services established or maintained for a public purpose: income security or insurance,
social security or insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health,
and child care." Very similar reservations appear in the Schedules of the Free Trade
Agreements with Panama, Honduras, Ukraine, and Korea as well. 
15 The continuation of the general Social Services Reservation in the renewed NAFTA or
Canada-US-Mexico  (CUSMA)  in  2018  was  deemed  essential  to  maintaining  public
support for the deal, and should not be construed as a sign of a general trend back
towards broader exemptions. Article 9.2 of the CETA concerns the scope of cross-border
trade in services and incorporates the familiar GATS language of excluding “services
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority,” defined as “any service that is not
supplied on a commercial basis, or in competition with one or more service suppliers."
This does not protect health services that are supplied on a competitive market basis,
even when there is a single public payer, and given the lack of any additional health-
related  reservations  or  non-derogation  clauses  in  the  Agreement,  health  care
protection  is  therefore  not  particularly  broad  or  robust.  While  the  use  of  non-
derogation  clauses  and  health-related  reservations  between  2008  and  2015  initially
looked promising as a  substitute for broad general  exemptions,  there is  an evident
preference  among  treaty  negotiators  and  the  business  community  to  make
international trade and investment law free of encumbrances other than compliance
with the basic GATT Article XX and SPS standards.
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16 The CPTPP states in its preamble that the parties "recognize further their inherent
right to adopt, maintain or modify health care systems"; and it contains commitments
to "reinforce and build on the (WTO) SPS Agreement", as well as the standard GATT
xx(b)  allowance  for  "environmental  measures  to  protect…health",  but  these  are
generally only relevant to basic Public Health rather than the design or delivery of
health care. Furthermore, Chapter 25 on "Regulatory Coherence" defines "good
regulatory  practices"  as  those  which  further  policy  objectives  and  promote
international trade and investment, economic growth, and employment." (25.2.1). Gone
are the general exemptions of an earlier generation of agreements and, with them, the
implicit claim that there is a large zone of democratic governance that does not have to
be balanced or rendered coherent with the goals and objectives of the liberal trade
regime. Occasional partial exceptions to this rule are provisions like the CETA Art. 9 (2),
which explicitly adopts the language of the GATS Article 1:3 in stating that the Chapter
on services trade does not apply to “services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority”.
17 The  new  Canada–U.S.-Mexico  Agreement  (CUSMA)  continues  to  have  the  Annex  II
reservation for health, but its precise meaning and scope remain uncertain. The Office
of the U.S.  Trade Representative has expressed a very narrow interpretation of the
clause, suggesting that any private or commercial elements in a health service could
cause it to fall outside of the exemption. Although NAFTA/CUSMA dispute resolution is
more likely to follow the international practice that emphasizes public funding and
takes a  somewhat more relaxed view of  private  delivery (Crawford 2006),  concerns
expressed  by  several  critics  and  commentators  during  the  development  and
implementation of the Canada-US FTA and NAFTA have been validated (Epps and Flood
2002;  McBride  2005).  The  degree  of  government  control  over  service  delivery,  and
public funding, as well  as the degree of government regulatory control and clearly,
expressed public purpose, are all factors that a trade dispute panel is likely to take into
account in determining whether a particular measure is a public service delivered for
public purposes.  Although US, Mexican, and other foreign corporations have only a
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modest financial stake in Canada’s health care sector, thereby diminishing the risk of
foreign investor claims, Canadian companies can always exploit the loophole revealed
by  the  Abitibi-Bowater  NAFTA  case  and  file  claims  through  their  U.S.  or  Mexican
subsidiaries. And if foreign suppliers ever do establish a strong commercial presence in
the health sector, it will be very difficult to reverse market concessions and avoid the
threat of future claims (Sanger, Shrybman, and Lexchin 204, 222). 
18 It can still be argued that we should not be alarmed by the steady diminution in the
scope  and  frequency  of  health-related  carve-outs,  or  by  the  demise  of  general
exemption  clauses  in  the  recent  bilateral  and  plurilateral  trade  and  investment
agreements. In the first place, even the GATS exemption and the NAFTA Social Services
Reservation  applying  to  the  investment  and services  chapters  are  not  true,  "pure"
exemptions: they placed public services outside of the trade regime only if a threshold
of commercial elements in payment and or delivery of services was not exceeded (see
discussion of payment and delivery reform below). Moreover, there has not been as
much legal mobilization to test the limits of these clauses as many had expected, and
there has arguably not been enough privatization or commercialization (the Chaoulli
case  notwithstanding)  to  cause  the  main  aspects  of  the  health  care  system  to  fall
outside of  their  scope.  If  there are reasons to  worry about trade liberalization and
health care, they may arise principally elsewhere, e.g. in the implications of entrenched
intellectual  property  and  investment  rights  for  drug  and  technology  costs.
Nevertheless, trade treaty obligations may become much more consequential if there is
a major change in the scope of medicare–such as a major shift towards privatization of
health  care  financing  or  delivery,  or  an  expansion  to  include  pharmacare,  nursing
homes,  home  care,  dental  care,  physiotherapy,  etc.  Rising  costs  and  a  climate  of
austerity in recent decades has meant that there has been little expansion of the areas
of health covered and few instances of governments trying to bring privatized health
services  back  into  the  public  sector;  an  implicit  assumption  of  Canada's  trade
agreements is that new services not already listed in reservations will not be covered
and that Canada's sheltered system of publicly-funded health care will shrink rather
than grow in the future (Crawford, 2006).
19 Concerning health care in the context of Canadian-European trade, it is worth recalling
that CETA differed from NAFTA, GATS, and most other negotiations in that it was with a
jurisdiction (the EU) that had welfare states that were typically more developed than
Canada's, with environmental and labor activists who were at least as radical and as
mobilized as those in Canada. When negotiations stalled, the Canadian and European
governments could have pursued a different, more minimalist strategy that focused
upon reducing trade restrictions and providing clearer carve-outs for essential medical
services, a strategy that was attractive to many civil society groups and political actors
within both Canada and Europe. It also would have been the most consistent approach
with the pre-2006 rhetoric about healthcare being “off the table” of international trade
negotiations.  Nevertheless,  the  Harper  government,  which  prided  itself  on  signing
trade deals and promoting investment, was willing (indeed anxious) to maintain at the
center  of  the  CETA  bargain  the  strengthening  of  investor-state  provisions  (giving
corporations the right to sue governments) as well as helping specific interests in the
mining,  manufacturing,  and beef  sectors  (Smith,  2017;  Van Harten,  2015).  This  was
consonant with general trends in the international trade agenda, so it was much easier
for  the  Liberals  to  add  a  few  “progressive”  clauses  and  side-agreements  to  the
neoliberal  agenda  rather  than  try  to  negotiate  a  reversal.  A  preference  for  policy
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“coherence“ between trade and investment law and domestic health rather than policy
“autonomy” was probably also ideologically  more congenial  to the centrist  Liberals
than a progressive resistance to this aspect of globalization.
 
03. Implications of the “Progressive” Trade Agenda for
Drug Policy and Pharmacare
20 By the time that the Liberals had returned to power in October of 2015,  they were
prepared  to  keep  contentious  items  like  stronger  drug  patents  and  investor-state
dispute settlement in CETA, but to balance and soften their impacts through a NAFTA-
style strategy of having additional legitimating clauses for international trade lawyers
to litigate, principally in the form of environmental and labour side-agreements. As a
way to promote beef and auto exports and avoid losing market share, while at the same
time temporarily assuaging trade critics, it was a successful strategy; but in the health
care sector (which is only lightly touched by the side agreements) consumers will be
mostly  negatively  impacted.  The amount  Canada's  economy could benefit  if  all  the
tariffs on EU imports into Canada were eliminated was pegged in 2008 at about $850
million annually (McGregor 2016). Yet the cost of extending drug patent protection by
two years (i.e. to recover time lost during the regulatory approval process) is estimated
to be in the range of between $795 million and $1.95 billion annually (Lexchin et.al
2014). In other words, the benefits to Canadian consumers of CETA will be wiped out by
higher drug prices, once the impact of patent protection is fully felt in the mid-2020s.
(On  the  producer  side,  the  principal  beneficiaries  appear  to  be  US  and  EU  drug
companies:  Canada’s chronic trade deficit  in pharmaceuticals  rose sharply after the
CETA was signed in October 2016, to $8.7 billion in 2017 and $8.5 billion in 2018.)
The federal government has announced that it will compensate provinces for the
rise in drug costs for their public drug plans. If this proves to be the case, then
instead of Canadian taxpayers paying the additional costs for prescription drugs at
the provincial level they will simply pay at the federal level. Importantly, people
paying out of pocket for their drugs, or through private insurance, will not benefit
from  this  compensation.  Estimates  are  that  13%  of  the  Canadian  population  is
either  uninsured  or  underinsured  for  prescription  drug  costs  ...  and  that  cost-
related nonadherence is 35% among people with low income and no insurance. ...
People with no drug coverage and paying out of pocket are usually people with
minimum wage jobs ... and are often the least able to absorb increases in prices. No
compensation  will  be  given  for  either  co-payments  or  deductibles  paid  out-of-
pocket  by  insured patients  covered  by  a  public  drug  plan.  Therefore,  whatever
compensatory measures the federal government is committing to, to help provinces
offset  the  predicted  cost  increases,  will  not  help  those  who  will  be  the  most
impacted by these increases. (Ibid., 7).
21 It has been estimated that having a new Universal prescription drug plan could save
Canadian consumers as much as $4.2 billion per year, but approximately a quarter of
that  amount  will  be  offset  by  losses  due  to  longer  patents  contained  in  our
international trade and investment agreements. The rationale? According to Canada’s
Research-Based  Pharmaceutical  Companies,  it  is  imperative  to  change  Canada’s
currently “uncompetitive” IPR regime. It was also deemed important to secure access
for Alberta beef and Ontario autos (up to 100,000 vehicles per year) to the European
market.  This  may  prove  to  be  a  politically  acceptable  and  reasonable  balance,
necessitated  by  the  location  of  most  major  pharmaceutical companies  within  the
Health Care and the Limits of “Progressive” Neoliberalism: Re-Evaluating the ...
Revue Interventions économiques, 65 | 2021
10
borders  of  our  two  largest  trading  partners,  and  the  need  to  foster  more  applied
research in the pharmaceutical industry within Canada. There is no evidence, however,
that previous concessions to the pharmaceutical industry since the Mulroney era have
resulted in increased research & development spending in Canada. It is also important
to bear in mind that currently, "competitive" patents do not represent a consensus
among  economists  as to  what  represents  the  optimal  patent,  since  (1)  much
pharmaceutical research is parasitic upon more basic research funded by Government,
(2)  shielding  companies  longer  from  the  competition  is  not  necessarily  better  for
innovation; (3) different countries and different sub-sections of the population have
extremely  different  welfare  impacts,  e.g.  there  is  a  strong  preference  for  cheap
generics in poor countries and among poorer seniors in wealthy countries (Braithwaite
and Drahos 2000, 386-390).
22 As a 2010 overview of the literature concluded, the elusiveness of a solution to the
patent  length  problem  “lies  within  patents'  contradictory  nature;  to  promote
innovation by excluding others from using the knowledge that is otherwise free and
inexhaustible, which prevents them from further building on the existing knowledge
for the possible benefit of society” (Kramming 2010, 31). The most significant analysis
of the effects of international trade and trade agreements upon optimal patent length
is that of Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, who conclude that generally speaking,
the  socially  optimal  amount  of  protection  decreases  as  the  scale  of  the  market
increases.  (Boldrin  and  Levine  2013,  3).  If  they  are  correct,  then  we  are  indeed
confronted by a paradox: the pure theory of trade suggests that we shorten patent
lengths  in  a  globalizing economy,  because  of  improved communications,  free  trade
agreements, etc. That means that it should take less time to recoup innovation costs
and make  a  reasonable  profit  than  it  used  to.  Yet  we  must  lengthen drug  patents
because modern 'trade' agreements include such impurities as patent protections for
industries  in  which  we  and/or  our  trading  partners  feel  there  is  a  comparative
advantage. 
23 Of course, the Boldrin-Levine thesis has been challenged: in one empirical study of the
effects of patent extension following the TRIPs Agreement, David S. Abrams found "an
increase in innovation [at least in the biotech industry] due to patent-term extension
following TRIPS" (Abrams 2009, 1613). It may be that the increasing size of markets due
to  globalization  and  free  trade  agreements  makes  the  recuperation  time  for
investments  shorter  and  therefore  the  patent  length  should  be  shorter,  but  that
product  life  cycles  and R&D costs  in  the  pharmaceutical  and biotech industry  may
mean that  they constitute  an exception.  Nevertheless,  the  official  rationale  for  the
existing  post-TRIPs  agreements,  which  have  involved  further  extensions  of  patent
length and other  provisions such as  data exclusivity  that  prevent  cheaper generics
from entering the marketplace, is not framed in terms of any such "exception". The
content of  TRIPs is  better explained by the power of  the U.S.  government,  and the
governments  of  other  signatories  such  as  Europe  and  Canada,  and  the  power  of
pharmaceutical,  film,  and  high-tech  industries  influencing  those  governments.  A
progressive  economic  nationalism  should  question  whether  increasingly  restrictive
intellectual property regimes are being created for the sake of health care. And the
media  and general  public  need to  be  reminded of  the  general  point  that  inserting
stronger intellectual property rights into international law is not “free trade” and does
not unambiguously guarantee greater global welfare.
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04. Implications of the “Progressive” Trade Agenda for
Health Care Reform: The Issue of Reversibility
24 At its most fundamental level, the problem posed by the intersection of international
trade regimes with domestic health care systems stems largely from a contradiction
between  their  respective  presumed  logics:  international  trade  rules  tend  to  be
negotiated,  then  written  and  interpreted  on  the  assumption  that  increasingly
liberalized markets are more efficient and better for growth and consumer choice and
welfare;  and  that  they  should  therefore  be  encouraged  to  grow  and  should  be
entrenched. Health economists and medical experts, on the other hand, tend to share
most citizens' view that health care utilization should be based on patients' needs, and
based on citizen equality,  and not  on  market  demand and supply.  This  contrast  is
bolstered by empirical evidence that private health insurance markets are prone to
higher costs and 'market failures' than are single-payer public systems (Arrow 1963;
Evans 2003). Trade rules thus carry an ideological bias that not only clashes with the
egalitarian  view  that  health  care  should  not  simply  be  for  sale  but  also  with  the
sophisticated view of most health economists that general inefficiencies and welfare
losses are likely to result from attempts to "lock-in" market-based approaches to health
care reform.
25 For  example,  'Payment  and Delivery  Reform'  refers  to  the  payment  (or  'free'  non-
payment) at the point of use versus premiums and/or general revenue and the choice
of the delivery system, which can include various kinds and degrees of public, not-for-
profit,  private,  commercial  /competitive  organizations  and  structures,  involving
varying degrees of centralization /decentralization. The tie-in with international trade
derives  primarily  from  the  potential  combination  of  the  general  market-style  or
market-driven  nature  of  many  healthcare  reforms  undertaken  domestically  with
international trade "exemptions" that are typically either constructed narrowly or are
written or  interpreted to  make any commercial  elements  automatically  exposed to
international trade rules. The Article 1:3 GATS Exclusion clause states that a service
"supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" is not covered by the GATS MFN
or NT obligations; and the NAFTA Annex I Social Service Reservation (carried over into
the USMC or NAFTA II),  which states that all  provincial  government measures that
were in force as of January 1, 1994, are outside the NAFTA rules relating to national
treatment, MFN, and some other disciplines relating to local presence requirements for
cross-border services and nationality requirements for senior managers. The difficulty
with the former is, as Markus Krajewski has written, that dependence of the scope of
governmental authority on the “circumstances of supply and not on the nature of the
service”  arguably  necessitates  a  narrow meaning of  the  clause,  and that  it  is  even
possible that universal publicly funded health services provided free of charge could be
subject to the agreement if hospitals or physicians that are organized on a for-profit
basis supply the services competitively (Krajewski 2003, 351-354). As for the latter, even
if it  is  interpreted generously,  areas that fall  outside the traditional features of the
Canadian health law—"medically necessary" hospital services and "medically required"
physician services—will likely not be covered.
26 As a result, the current scope of “protections” for health care in international trade
agreements preserve ex-ante flexibility, but not reversibility. The degree of autonomy
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of domestic health care policy from trade law rests largely on three variables: (1) the
level of international trade in health and health services; (2) the levels and kinds of
international trade litigation and dispute resolution as they relate to health; and (3) the
importance of markets in national and international health care reform. Since all of
these  factors  are  growing  in  importance,  even  countries  that  freeze  their  trade
commitments  relating  to  health  may  find  their  domestic  policies  increasingly
circumscribed by trade policy considerations.  Thus,  although the optimism of trade
agreement defenders may be well-founded when viewed from a static perspective, the
protection  afforded  by  exemption  clauses  and  careful  scheduling  of  commitments
shrinks with the expansion of market elements in healthcare. Health policymakers will
not have the luxury to engage in "business as usual", but rather will need to assess the
trade-related  risks  associated  with  market-based  reform  in  the  future.  To  better
coordinate health and trade policy, officials need to systematically consider the various
risk  scenarios  posed  by  (1)  changes  in  international  trading  regime;  (2)  different
models of health care reform; (3) technological change and health service innovations;
and (4) the market elements implicit in changing healthcare systems.
27 Healthcare reforms that either privatize health care or that seek to regulate already-
private systems most readily incur extensive trade treaty regulation. It should not be
taken for granted, however, that trends in healthcare lead necessarily toward greater
privatization  and  therefore  greater  exposure  to  trade  treaty  obligations.  Table  2
summarizes some major trends in healthcare as  described in Michael  Decter’s  2002
book  Four  Strong  Winds:  a  couple  of  these  trends  (growing  Public  Expectations  and
Financial Pressures –the second and fourth rows in the table) are often interpreted to
suggest  the need for  increased market  choice  and competitive delivery,  but  that  is
highly contestable in different contexts. Moreover, neither the accent upon prevention
nor technological change (the first and third rows of the table) points unambiguously
toward either the likelihood or the desirability of using private markets. What this 'big
picture' of healthcare trends suggests is that (1) health care reforms undertaken in
response to these pressures should be formulated with possible exposure to trade rules
in mind; and (2) trade treaty obligations that are intended to foster and then lock in
market-based solutions to health care problems ought to be used very carefully and
selectively, lest they prove counter-productive to several desired outcomes. 
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28 A  renewed  desire  for  policy  autonomy  could  make  potential  alignments  possible
between "progressive" and "economic nationalist" trade policy agendas. Like economic
nationalists, progressives can see diminishing gains from trade liberalization, coupled
with rising costs in terms of trading regimes' constraint on universal and affordable
healthcare. But as long as progressivism is yoked to the conventional neoliberal trade
agenda, as it is in the current Canadian Liberal trade policy, the potential for such a
rapprochement (or a "progressive economic nationalism") is quite limited. From this
perspective, the Liberal government's approach to saving the CETA in 2015-2016 may
have been a missed opportunity: Canada was negotiating with a partner whose various
welfare  states  and  recalcitrant  pressure  groups  had  as  much  to  gain  from  more
categorical protection of health care as Canada's did, yet a broader or more categorical
carve-out was not seriously considered. 
 
05. Conclusion: From “Democratic Autonomy” to
“Progressive Neoliberalism” in Health and Trade: Is
There a Way Back?
29 Globalization  doesn't  just  call  for  constraining  government,  but  for  enabling  the
government  to  respond  locally  to  new  contingencies;  yet  trade  and  investment
agreements like CETA and the CPTPP "commit citizens to certain forms through which
politics  is  practiced  and  institutionalize  a  legal  incapacity  to  act  in  a  variety  of
economic  matters.  These  features…are  premised  on  a  distrust  of  democratic
institutions familiar to students of constitutional theory" (Schneiderman, 2008, 17).
30 Although  the  “Governmental  Authority”  exemption  still  features  prominently  in
Article 1:3 of the GATS, and the NAFTA Social Service Reservation still arguably shields
health services that are largely publicly financed, these types of clauses feature less
prominently  in  more  recent  bilateral  and  plurilateral  agreements,  while  investor
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dispute  settlement  and  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  have  become
standardized  and  entrenched.  Canada  has  chosen  to  add  "progressive"  measures
regarding  labor  and  the  environment  onto  a  wider  and more  intrusive  regulatory
framework  aimed  at  constitutionalizing  the  neoliberal  trade  agenda,  rather  than
promoting a  less  intrusive  regulatory  scheme  with  clearer  carve-outs  for  domestic
policy areas such as health. 
31 One  reason  for  questioning  this  strategy  is  similar  to  Andrew  Lang’s  objection  to
projects  of  institutional  coherence between trade and human rights  regimes:  “such
projects risk turning our attention away from other kinds of debates and discussions
which  are  an  important  precondition  for  productive  re-imagining  of  global  trade
governance in response to contemporary challenges” (Lang 2011,  137).  By choosing
policy tools and legal instruments that force ‘coherence’ between trade and health, we
may  be  compromising  the  integrity  and  legitimacy  of  each:  as  when  we  ask  WTO
dispute settlement bodies to make rulings based on non-WTO Law, or when we discover
that  health  policy  space  is  more  circumscribed  by  commitments  to  intellectual
property and investment regimes than we had previously thought.
32 Related to this critique, and to some extent underpinning it, is simply that there are
diminishing economic returns to trade liberalization, a fact pointed to by an increasing
number  of  analysts  (e.g.  Rodrik  2018;  Autour  et  al.  2016).  The  biggest  and  most
unambiguous gains from trade for consumers were obtained by traditional agreements
that eliminated tariffs. (Remaining tariffs are now very small for most traded goods.)
The  rationales  for  most  recent  negotiations,  however,  are  other  factors  such  as
competition for  capital;  geopolitical  concerns  (such as  the  Obama rationale  for  the
TPP); the desire to maximize exploitation of intellectual property rights because that is
where the comparative advantage of the United States and Europe lies;  and fear of
trade diversion. A common thread underlying each of these rationales is lobbying by
investors  and  multinational  corporations  who  are  the  biggest  and  most  immediate
beneficiaries of the new trade agreements: “In all these areas, the TPP and TTIP seemed
to be not so much about liberalism as about corporate capture” (Rodrik 2018, 212).
Official statements and public discussion often obscures this fact by continuing to use
the “growing pie” metaphor, often because well-meaning economists and government
officials are afraid of a return to protectionism. 
33 The threat posed by the populist conservative variant of economic nationalism is not
just that of protectionism, but of actual trade perversity: the continued strengthening
and  entrenchment  of  trade-related  investment  and  intellectual  property  rights,
coupled with an erosion of commitment to trade liberalization in goods and services.
For all of President Trump’s talk of “taking our country back” and restoring national
sovereignties, there has been little or no talk about weakening the legal frameworks
that  have been established for the sake of  American and European investment and
intellectual  property  regimes.  Protectionism is  ironically  focused on the traditional
domains of natural resource and manufacturing exports—areas where historically the
actual welfare gains of the international trading system have perhaps been the clearest.
34 It was already clear in the first decade of this century that standard “governmental
authority” and “social service” exclusions in trade agreements would not in themselves
insulate healthcare policy and healthcare reform from trade treaty obligations that
would make healthcare reforms either less effective (e.g. through higher drug prices)
or less flexible (by undermining policy reversibility due to “locked” in investment and
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IP obligations). This suggested the need to more fully coordinate trade and health and
social policy, by weighing the potential costs of trade treaty obligations triggered by
experiments  in  market-style  or  market-driven  healthcare  policies  (Crawford  2006).
Although the  recent  populist  backlash  against  economic  integration  in  Europe  and
North America threatens us with trade policy perversity, it also has a rational economic
basis (i.e. in declining economic returns from trade liberalization). It also has a solid
respectable basis in legitimate democratic norms. As Rodrik notes, 
35 "The  notion  of  fair  trade  is  much  derided  by  economists  who  view  it  as  a  thinly
disguised cover for self-interested protectionism. But it is already enshrined in trade
laws  (in  the  form  of  antidumping  and  safeguard  remedies),  although  in  a  skewed,
corporation-friendly way. So rather than abandon the fair trade concept, we should
broaden it, as it exists in trade law, to include social dumping. Just as countries can
impose duties on goods that are sold below costs, they should be allowed to restrict
imports that demonstrably threaten damage to domestic regulatory arrangements… I
would argue that this would not open the trade regime to more protectionist abuse
than current antidumping practices already do! The benefit of thinking about fair trade
along these lines is that it allows the drawing of a clear line between trade flows that
threaten legitimate domestic political arrangements and those that don’t” (ibid., 231). 
36 Health  care  advocates  who  used  to  hold  out  hope  for  “carve-outs”  from  trade
agreements may wish instead to embrace a progressive strategy that operates on two
tracks.  First,  from  the  domestic  or  micro-level  (e.g.  Canadian  provincial  health
policymakers) they should carefully weigh the risk that market-style reforms may be
difficult to reverse under existing NAFTA, WTO, and bilateral investment law. This may
require a greater degree of mobilization and pressure at local  and provincial  levels
than has been evident thus far. Second, on the international level, they should seek to
harness  the  new  openness  to  economic  nationalism  by  challenging  the  prevailing
wisdom on drug patents and by negotiating rules against “social dumping” (i.e. trade
flows that harm domestic health policies). Recent trade agreements such as the CPTPP
have further empowered corporate actors by involving them not only extensively in
negotiating  committees,  but  also  in  various  regulatory  harmonization  committees
aimed at implementing the agreement in several areas affecting health, such as alcohol
and  tobacco,  recognition  of  medical  credentials,  regulation  of  chemicals,  and  food
labeling. Since the argument for "Health in All Policies" has received a powerful boost
due to the coronavirus pandemic, perhaps national health ministries and medical and
scientific communities could be similarly empowered in trade governance circles to
protect and advance health care objectives such as lower drug costs and broader health
insurance coverage. That may be a more promising way forward than simply putting a
progressive  veneer  on  a  fundamentally  neoliberal  trade  strategy  that  still  serves
domestic producer interests far more effectively than those of consumers, including
the consumers of health.
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ABSTRACTS
From 1995 to 2006, Canadian trade policy purported to insulate the Canadian health care system
from the effects  of  trade liberalization,  largely  through reliance  upon key general  exclusion
clauses in the NAFTA and the GATS and other legal strategies. During the Conservative years
2006-2015  the  government  de-emphasized  these  strategies,  and  (more  importantly)  the
international  trade  agenda  increasingly  emphasized  investment  promotion  and  patent
protection. When the Liberal Party returned to government in 2015, personal, structural, and
ideological factors all pointed to the retention of the neoliberal trade agenda, but one which was
legitimated  by  more  'progressive'  features,  such  as  side-agreements.  This  paper  traces  the
evolution of 'progressive neoliberalism' in the trade-health interface and argues that we need to
recognize  the  inherent  limitations  of  an  approach  that  preaches  harmony  and  coherence
between domestic health care and international trade law.
De 1995 à 2006, la politique commerciale canadienne visait à protéger le système canadien de
soins  de  santé  des  effets  de  la  libéralisation des  échanges,  en  grande partie  en se  fiant  aux
principales  clauses  générales  d'exclusion  de  l'ALENA  et  de  l'AGCS  et  à  d'autres  stratégies
juridiques. Pendant les années conservatrices 2006-2015, le gouvernement a mis l'accent sur ces
stratégies et, plus important encore, le programme commercial international a de plus en plus
mis l'accent sur la promotion des investissements et la protection des brevets. Lorsque le Parti
libéral est revenu au gouvernement en 2015, des facteurs personnels, structurels et idéologiques
ont  tous  mis  en  évidence  le  maintien  du  programme  commercial  néolibéral,  mais  qui  était
légitimé par des caractéristiques plus « progressistes », comme les accords parallèles. Cet article
retrace  l'évolution  du  «  néolibéralisme  progressiste  »  dans  l'interface  commerce-santé  et
soutient  que  nous  devons  reconnaître  les  limites  inhérentes  d'une  approche  qui  prêche
l'harmonie  et  la  cohérence  entre  les  soins  de  santé  nationaux  et  le  droit  commercial
international.
INDEX
Mots-clés: politique commerciale, politique de santé, néolibéralisme progressiste, droit des
investissements, politique pharmaceutique
Keywords: trade policy, health policy, progressive neoliberalism, investment law, drug policy
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